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Abstract 
Social media are increasingly entrenched in politicians’ campaigning.  Yet even as they 
become more ubiquitous, evidence suggests widely used platforms normalize rather than 
equalize the existing power dynamics of the political landscape. Our study of NZ’s general 
election uses a mixed-method approach including analysis of five Party Leaders’ (PLs) public 
Facebook wall posts, campaign coverage in four newspapers, and interviews with Party 
workers and MPs. Our findings show PLs seldom interact with citizens and mostly use posts 
to promote campaign information.  Citizens are more likely to ‘like’ a PL’s post than share or 
comment and there are important divergences between Party and media agendas. These 
findings demonstrate the importance of social media for Parties’ attempts to control 
messaging and disrupt journalistic interference, but also highlight that neither Parties nor 
citizens seem much invested in dialogue.  However, understanding which posts excite citizen 
engagement may help all Parties promote participatory democracy globally.  
 
Text 
Politicians who have adopted Facebook cite the desire to appear modern, to bypass media 
gatekeepers and to interact with voters as motivations to join the platform (Keller and Kleinen-
von Koningslow, 2018; Magin et al., 2016; Skovsgaard and van Dalen, 2013; Sorensen, 2016).  
As Facebook usage increases among the general population of most modern democracies, it 
has also become an important social media platform in the political sphere (Bosseta, 2018; 
Magin et al., 2016; Yarchi and Samuel-Azran, 2018), though individual politicians’ adoption 
  
rates vary markedly within and across countries.  For example, just 26% of Swiss politicians 
were on Facebook in 2015 (Keller and Kleinen-von Koningslow) whereas 97% of Danish 
politicians were using Facebook in 2014, likely impacted by resourcing levels and the extent of 
parties’ cross-sectional appeal (Quinlan et al., 2018).  It is surprising that uptake is not more 
widespread given the equalization rhetoric of social media and at least some evidence that 
politicians adopting social media receive increased public attention (van Aelst et al., 2017).  
However, given the time lag between the publication of research and the reality on the ground, 
it is very likely that uptake levels are moving towards saturation. 
Once politicians are signed up to Facebook, their activity levels diverge (e.g. Keller and 
Kleinen-von Kongslow, 2018; Magin et al., 2016; Sorensen, 2016) but some general trends 
emerge.  Politicians’ Facebook posts tend to focus on a combination of information, 
mobilization and to a lesser extent, interaction (e.g. Magin et al.) – or marketing, mobilization 
and dialogue (cited in Sorensen) – with the information-sharing ability of Facebook especially 
appealing to politicians, parties and campaign teams.  This informational content is mostly 
heavy on visuals and not overly political in language or style (Magin et al.).   Studies of 
politicians seeking the top job in politics show similar trends, for example, a considerable 
proportion of Facebook posts made by US presidential candidates comprise links, mostly to 
campaign websites and media items (Bossetta, 2018).  Larsson’s (2015) study of Norwegian 
leaders’ Facebook posts captured high levels of campaign reports and informing, with little 
critique.  The importance of social media research distinguishing between different platforms’ 
content (Bossetta 2018; Stier et al., 2018) is emphasized in multi-platform studies showing, for 
instance, that campaigning topics comprise nearly half of Facebook posts and are much more 
common in politicians’ Facebook posts than on Twitter (ibid.), and video content more common 
on Facebook than other platforms (Bossetta, op.cit.).  The presence of mobilization content on 
  
Facebook likely reflects the nature of the platform where most followers are already 
supporters, thus logical targets for increased involvement, though some studies also note 
politicians’ unwillingness to be too direct with mobilization requests for fear of alienating 
voters. 
Despite its networked architecture and some suggestion that voters respond favorably 
to politician interventions in online conversational threads (Meeks, 2019; Utz, 2009), few 
politicians engage in sustained, genuine dialogue on Facebook (Magin et al., 2016; Ross et al., 
2015).  This may reflect resource limitations and perceived risks or be a corollary of passive 
engagement by citizens online, where modest levels of follower engagement are the rule. A 
negative discussion culture may also inhibit interactivity (Magin et al.). As with activity levels, 
politicians’ Facebook interactivity or engagement varies by individual, party, country and 
context, with some support for the notion that female politicians and those from smaller 
parties interact more (Sorensen, 2016; Yarchi and Samuel-Azran, 2018). Sorensen found most 
politicians engaged in some form of dialogue with followers in 2014, possibly reflecting the 
highly-engaged electorate and the non-campaign context of his study, or because of ‘a general 
evolution in the use of Facebook’ (680).  Kok-Michalska et al’s (2016) findings are also 
consistent with an evolution in digital usage: all parties in the four countries they studied 
significantly increased ‘web 2.0’ components of their websites between 2009 and 2014, 
although ‘1.0’ features still prevailed, and there was a shift from a mobilization to an interactive 
strategy in Germany, Poland and the UK.  In one of the few longitudinal studies, albeit of 
Twitter, Meeks (2019) captured an increase in two candidates’ interactivity between 2012 and 
2014, with her definition of interactivity including photos of politicians interacting with others.  
This idea that an evolution in Facebook use will necessarily result in more interaction is, 
however, contradicted in another non-campaign study, in Austria in 2015, showing that ‘the 
  
more publicity and public attention a profile receives, the less political actors are willing to 
react to user comments’ (Heiss et al., 2018: 1510).  Evolution may in fact be a less apt metaphor 
than the ebb and flow thesis advanced by Kok-Michalska et al. (op.cit.) or the cyclical 
dimensions noted by Quinlin et al. (2018).   
Politicians’ communicative activity is only part of the equation if we are to understand 
the role of new technologies in equalizing or normalising political power. In terms of visibility, 
we need to examine not only who speaks (i.e., their presence on the platform and the number 
of posts) but also who gets heard, through considering the reach of messaging on social media.  
For various reasons (such as algorithms), politicians’ activity per se is not clearly associated with 
impact.  Keller and Kleinen von-Konigslow (2018) concluded that intensive activity on Facebook 
does not lead directly to more digital reactions (likes, comments, shares) but there are indirect 
effects such as more activity leading to more followers leading to more reactions.  ‘Likes’ are 
the most popular form of feedback, followed by comments and shares: ‘lower or less 
demanding forms of engagements appear as most common’ (Keller and Kleinen von-Konigslow, 
2018: 469; see also Larsson, 2015).  The extent of likes and shares is influenced by the use of 
humor and expressions of enthusiasm and fear in messages (Metz et al., 2019); similarly, 
comments are stimulated by issue polarisation, humor and positive emotions (Heiss et al., 
2018; Larsson, 2015).  There is also some evidence that high levels of audience engagement are 
linked to messages which include private or intimate self-personalisation (Metz et al.), the least 
frequent forms of personalisation used by politicians. In their work on Israeli politicians, Yarchi 
and Samuel-Azran (2018) found that women politicians achieved higher levels of engagement 
on Facebook than male colleagues which they argued was a result of their greater propensity to 
share personal information and make attacking comments.  Larsson (2015) showed 
acknowledging support and making critical commentary (the least present topics) also resulted 
  
in the most engagement with Norwegian leaders’ Facebook posts and noted the tension 
between what politicians talk about and what topics activate and animate the Facebook 
audience. 
While the ability of social media to circumvent media gatekeepers is widely identified as 
an attractive equalizing opportunity, particularly for small parties (Magin et al., 2016) and 
women, relatively few studies have looked closely at the relationship between political content 
on social media (specifically Facebook) and mainstream political news content. The limited 
number of studies suggest that the agendas of traditional news media (produced by journalists) 
and ‘political’ social media (mostly produced by journalists and political actors) are related and 
work together to influence the overall visibility of politicians.  Stier et al. (2018: 67) suggest 
there are ‘persistent – although probably diffuse and mediated – agenda-setting effects 
between mass media and social media…as well as within social media.’  Studies of Twitter and 
news media suggest a connection, not around activity level but popularity.  Van Aelst et al 
(2017: 728) found that activity level on Twitter was not correlated to media attention but that 
popularity was connected, and ‘a small political elite of predominantly party leaders and 
ministers is successful on both platforms’.  In this way, ‘social media replicate existing 
imbalanced representations in traditional media’ (Kruikemeier et al., 2018: 224). In other 
words, key political actors continue to gain high visibility while everyone else struggles for 
attention. Keller and Kleinen von-Konigslow (2018: 8) also found ‘the structural advantages of 
high levels of media coverage best predicts social media success’ although the impact was less 
clear-cut on Facebook than Twitter. Our study thus contributes to both the extensive global 
literature around politicians’ social media usage and the lesser-studied dynamic between social 
media and mainstream media agendas. 
 
  
The NZ context and the 2017 election campaign 
NZ’s electoral system is mixed member proportional (MMP), a form of proportional 
representation where voters cast two votes: one for their representative in a geographic 
district (electorate vote) and one for their preferred party (party vote).  Although most 
parties seek ‘two ticks’ from voters, tactical vote-splitting is common and some smaller 
parties prioritize campaigning for the party vote which, if over the 5% threshold, determines 
their share of seats in the 120-member Parliament.   
Mainstream coverage of the 2017 election campaign was dominated by the Party 
Leaders (PLs), particularly of the two main parties, National and Labour (Levine, 2018; Mills 
et al., 2018). While this is not unusual, in this election it was particularly acute because 
Labour had elected a new (young, female) leader – Jacinda Ardern – just weeks before 
election day.  Under her leadership, Labour quickly became a credible opposition party for 
the high-polling National-led government which had hitherto been predicted as the obvious 
election winner. The final election result would see Ardern become Prime Minister, leading 
a three-party coalition government, although the National Party won nearly half the party 
vote (44% compared to Labour 37%, NZ First 7% and the Green Party 6%).  
Given the importance of Facebook in contemporary political communication and the 
ongoing celebrification of politicians (Street, 2003; Wheeler, 2012), we were interested to 
see how PLs presented themselves on Facebook. The specificities of the political context of 
the 2017 election offered a useful opportunity to consider the importance of the PL as 
figurehead and proxy for the all-important party vote, given that three were incumbents 
and two (including the only woman) were very recently in post.  While we acknowledge that 
politicians, especially PLs, do not always write their own social media (see also Adams and 
McCorkindale, 2013; Zamora Medina and Zurutuza Muñoz, 2014), what is posted under 
  
their names nonetheless says something important about how they (or their campaign 
teams) wish to present themselves and we are interested in this conscious aspect of 
presenting the ‘self’.  We also wanted to determine if the issue-based content of PLs’ posts 
aligned with the mainstream news media’s agenda. Much of the research about politicians’ 
motivations to use social media platforms suggests that a primary reason is precisely to 
circumvent the gatekeeping and ventriloquising tendencies of journalists (Hong et al., 2019; 
Larsson and Kalsnes, 2014; Ross et al., 2015). Lastly, we wanted to explore first-level public 
reaction to the PLs’ posts, given social media’s ability to extend the reach of messages 
through sharing, and facilitating interactions through likes and comments. 
Method 
We chose to focus on Facebook since it is the most widely used social media platform in NZ 
(Gervai, 2017).  We collected every Facebook post published across the full campaign period 
(23 August-22 September 2017) from the public pages of the five main PLs: Bill English 
(National); Jacinda Ardern (Labour); James Shaw (Green); Winston Peters (NZ First); and Te 
Ururoa Flavell (Maori).  The posts were captured manually as screenshots after each original 
post had been up for 48 hours.  The Parties selected for analysis had all achieved a minimum 
of two MPs in the 2014-17 term. While that term saw seven parties represented in 
Parliament (centre-right National forming a minority government with support of the Maori 
Party, ACT and United Future), both the latter Parties had just one MP, as a result of winning 
an electorate seat with the tactical support of National. The Maori and Green Parties 
traditionally have two co-leaders, but we decided to follow just one (co) Leader for each 
party to enable a direct comparison, not least because Green Co-Leader Metiria Turei 
resigned (and was not replaced) just weeks before the campaign. For the Maori Party, 
  
Flavell was the logical choice because of his higher profile and because it was his electorate 
win in 2014 that brought his female co-Leader Marama Fox into Parliament as a list MP.   
We also undertook a quantitative content analysis of all election-related stories and 
columns published during the official campaign period in NZ’s two highest-circulating daily 
newspapers (Dominion Post and NZ Herald), and the two main Sunday publications (Sunday 
Star Times and Herald on Sunday).  These newspapers also represent the country’s two 
major ownership chains. We coded 527 newspaper items, from 23 August to 22 September 
inclusive, for topic, sources, tone, visuals and personal comment.   
We contacted all five PLs seeking an interview about their Facebook activities but 
only Te Ururoa Flavell agreed to an interview. However, we also interviewed Tory Whanau 
(Chief of Staff for the Green Party), Neale Jones (ex-Chief of Staff for Labour) and Paula 
Bennett (Deputy Leader, National).  
 
Findings 
We start by providing basic data about the volume and content of the 606 posts. The first 
aspect to note is the considerable difference in the volume of posts sent from the five PLs’ 
accounts, with Flavell sending the most (173) and Shaw the least (41). Peters was the third 
most prolific (138) behind National’s English, who made nearly twice as many posts (169) as 
Labour’s Ardern (85). The low volume of Green Party posts is surprising, as in previous 
elections, in NZ and elsewhere, Green MPs have tended to be very active on social media. 
However, Whanau explained they were under-staffed and under-resourced (2018, personal 
communication).   
Nearly three-quarters (72%) of posts included photos or moving image content, with 
only 7% being text-only, although this figure conceals significant Party differences (for 
  
example, Peters made 67% of text-only posts).  The most frequently used images were 
photos of the PL with at least one other person, but more often a group of people (29% of 
all posts included this kind of content), followed by photos of events (10%), other people 
only (9%) and the PL with family members (4%).  Interactive photos showing MPs with 
citizens were the most frequent type of accompanying image for English (39%), Ardern 
(36%) and Peters (31%).  Photos with children and young people were included in 9% of all 
posts, including in nearly a fifth of all photos posted by Ardern and 11% of those posted by 
English.  Ardern’s more frequent use of photos of herself with young people was part of 
Labour’s campaign strategy to attract younger voters and leverage Ardern’s popularity and 
dynamism. Labour’s Chief of Staff explained: 
 
We printed a load of white T-shirts with ‘Let’s do this’ on them and our standard 
backdrop was a load of people wearing those T-shirts, standing behind her looking 
excited and happy and having fun. It shows that she’s popular, that she’s engaging 
people. (Jones, 2018, personal communication)   
 
Just over 25% of Shaw’s posts contained images of himself only whereas the most 
popular type of image included in Flavell’s posts was photos of other people (16%). 
Arguably, Shaw’s strategy was intended to boost face recognition of himself as Green PL, 
given he was the least well-known of the five. Of the small proportion of photos which did 
not feature people at all, 67% were posted by Flavell and his posts also accounted for more 
than half of those which only included photos of other people (58%). The propensity of 
Flavell’s posts to feature other people may reflect him doing much of his social media 
himself without campaign support (2018, personal communication). Although Flavell was 
  
the least likely to include photos of himself with young people (only 4% of all his posts), he 
was strategic in leveraging his daughter’s social media presence to reach out to younger 
voters, since she (Miria) had a significant following in her own right: 
 
It was her post which I shared. She’s younger and has a large following so the post 
reached that younger generation. It had some humor, it had some realism with a 
daughter talking to her dad. (Flavell, 2018, personal communication) 
 
Of particular interest in terms of images is the extent to which PLs’ families were 
included in their posts. While photos of PLs with family members were relatively infrequent 
(4% overall), the majority were posted by English (77%), followed by Flavell (14%) and 
Ardern (9%). In the case of English, his wife and his children featured more or less equally 
alongside him on the election trail at formal events, with a few showing him and his family 
at home but still in campaign mode. Flavell’s family photos were all of him and his daughter. 
Ardern posted only two photos of herself and her partner, one at a campaign event and one 
at a recreational event.  Neither Peters’ nor Shaw’s posts included any family photos. 
Interestingly, this pattern of including or excluding family members was mostly replicated in 
mainstream media coverage, with 26 stories featuring English’s family compared with 18 
mentioning Ardern’s family (mostly her parents) and even fewer for Peters (five mentions of 
his partner) and Shaw (one mention of his mother). But there were no mentions of Flavell’s 
family and, indeed, there was barely any mention of him at all in the mainstream media. 
Given the importance of visual material for social media, we were also interested in 
moving images, especially live video which was then a relatively new but increasingly 
popular Facebook feature. Just over a quarter (27%) of all posts contained some kind of 
  
moving image including around a third of posts from English, Ardern and Flavell, with 
Peters’ posts including the least amount of such imagery (15%). The majority (48%) of video 
content from all PLs comprised Party Election Broadcasts (PEBs) or other kind of direct-to-
camera party messaging.  Other types of video content were favored by particular PLs, for 
example, English, Ardern and Flavell used Facebook live video but only English and Flavell 
uploaded video content which included family members. Only Peters posted video content 
from Parliamentary debates, only Ardern posted video selfies and only Flavell posted video 
content produced by non-political organizations.  
As well as noting visuals and moving image content, we also captured the extent to 
which PLs activated other elements of Facebook’s architecture including embedding links to 
external content: 20% of all PLs’ posts included weblinks, the majority to their own Party 
websites (43%) or mainstream news sites/other media outlets (48%).  These results are very 
similar to Bossetta’s (2018) study of US presidential candidates.   
 
Posting political content 
As well as form and format, we were obviously also interested in content.  First, we 
considered the broad topic of posts and, unsurprisingly, the predominant focus was on PLs’ 
own campaigns (45%), with promoting their Party’s campaign the next most frequent topic 
(19%).  Altogether, campaigning-related posts comprised nearly two-thirds of all posts, 
reflecting the findings of other studies of PLs’ posts (Larsson, 2015), although there were 
some interesting differences between the candidates. For example, 77% of English’s posts 
were campaign-focused, compared with 55% of those produced by Flavell. Peters’ and 
Shaw’s campaign posts constituted 69% of their total posts, and Ardern’s was 68%, although 
Shaw was the only politician who made more campaign posts about his Party than himself. 
  
Again, this is perhaps unsurprising because of all the Leaders, Shaw was the least well-
known. Greens’ Chief of Staff explained: 
 
We started off quite light because in a way we were rebuilding our brand…we had lost 
a lot of trust from the public and the polls showed that…so we wanted to spend the 
last few weeks building up James as a really likable leader and non-controversial. 
(Whanau, 2018, personal communication) 
 
Whanau’s analysis was borne out by the newspaper coverage of the PLs where we found 
that Ardern, English and Peters were much more likely to be the topic of a news article than 
their respective parties, but the opposite was true for Shaw. 
 
Policy matters 
Around a quarter (24%) of all posts mentioned a policy topic although the frequency of 
mentions varied significantly between the five PLs, from 61% of Shaw’s posts, down to 7% of 
those made by Flavell: policy topics were mentioned in 40% of posts made by English, 26% 
of those made by Ardern and 15% by Peters. Some aspect of policy was also mentioned in 
37% of the mainstream election coverage.  When asked about his low volume of policy-
oriented posts, Flavell said that policy-focused social media content was disliked by 
supporters, and he made a conscious effort to play politics ‘lite’:  
 
Someone took a photo of me dancing with our children in our house and it got 
thousands of hits and comments about my style but you put up a policy item and you 
get no response whatsoever… Sometimes people don’t really know what the issues 
  
are about so laying them out in a fun way…seemed to work as people were tuning in 
regularly and enjoying the engagement. (2018, personal communication) 
 
While there is little published evidence to support the view that humor generated by 
politicians themselves is appreciated or prompts positive voting action, some politicians 
nonetheless give humor the benefit of the doubt. Paula Bennett also mentioned including 
humor to convey a sense of ordinariness of the political persona (2018, personal 
communication). This more playful approach to political communication is most clearly seen 
in posts made by Flavell where the humor is largely self-deprecating and directed at himself 
and/or his co-Leader, Marama Fox. 
As far as policy topics were concerned, a large number of different ones were 
mentioned but the top five, across Facebook and mainstream news, are captured in Table 1.  
 
Table 1.  Top five policy topics from PLs’ posts and mainstream news articles 
 
Facebook policy topics % of policy 
posts 
Mainstream news 
policy topics 
% of policy 
topics  
Economy 19 Economy 11 
Environment 15 Tax 10 
Education 11 Housing 10 
Health 11 Education 8 
Welfare or social issues 9 Health/crime 5 
 
  
Again, composited categories listed in Table 1 conceal significant differences between 
Parties. For example, the top topic for English was the economy (26% of his policy posts), 
followed by general support for National’s policy agenda (18%) and then education (15%).  
For Ardern, the top three policy topics were health (32%) and then education, housing and 
the environment on 14% each. On the other hand, Peters’ priorities were the economy 
(38%), followed by the environment and welfare reform both on 19%. Flavell’s top three 
policies were equality/Maori language (50%), welfare reform (25%) and the environment 
(17%).  Lastly, Shaw was mostly interested in the environment (40%), health (16%) and 
education (12%). No PL’s agenda had a clear overlap with the mainstream media agenda, 
although the economy was the top topic across both formats.  PLs were more likely to post 
about the environment and health rather than tax or crime, but Flavell’s policy concerns, 
particularly around Maori, were most notably out of sync with the mainstream news 
agenda.  Interestingly, across all the election news articles, Ardern was mentioned in 
relation to tax more than twice as often (54%) as English (23%) and was the PL most 
mentioned in any policy-focused news item (48%) compared with English (31%).  Flavell 
received no traction in the mainstream media with any of his messages about equality for 
the Maori community or language, and although these were occasional topics of opinion 
pieces, he was never directly referenced.  
Given our focus on the PLs’ public Facebook pages, perhaps it is not surprising that so 
few posts were non-political (6%), of which 33% mentioned family members. The vast 
majority of these posts were made by Flavell (40%) and English (31%) – the traditional 
‘father figures’ in the sample – with the other PLs much more reticent about publicising 
aspects of their personal lives.  
  
Similarly, news articles included very few (3%) mentions of personal aspects of the 
PLs’ lives, although slightly more mentions of their family members (9%). Across both types 
of personalized commentary, the primary focus was Ardern (66% of personal mentions and 
37% of family-focused comments) and English (53% of family-focused comments and 22% of 
personalized comments). The focus on English’s family members, mostly mentions of his 
wife, reflects other studies suggesting that the wives of PLs receive more visibility than 
women political candidates during elections (Harmer, 2015).  
These differences between message content sent by politicians/parties and news 
content about those politicians/parties provide further support for the suggestion that 
Facebook is used by political actors to control content and frame preferred meaning, 
removing the interpretive lens of the journalist. Another major difference identified 
between the two forms of communication, at least in our study, is orientation, with posts 
being almost entirely devoid of negative content, including attack campaigning. This 
contrasts with most mainstream news outlets where journalists are routinely critical of 
politicians of all colours, almost as a default setting.  
 
Ask the audience 
The aspect of social media most promoted as potentially shifting the rules of political 
engagement is the dialogic communication between politicians and citizens enabled 
through mechanisms such as commenting, liking and sharing. However, most research on 
politicians’ use of social media, especially Facebook and Twitter, suggests that despite this 
potential for interactivity and direct communication, politicians and Parties are much more 
likely to simply replicate the kinds of monologic flow found in other forms of digital 
communication such as websites and email (Magin et al., 2017; Stromer-Galley, 2000).  
  
Interactivity though comments 
We found that all PLs engaged in some degree of interactivity during the campaign, with 
Flavell being particularly interactive, making 103 responses to comments made on 58 of his 
posts. Aside from Flavell, we noted 26 responses to 18 posts made by the other PLs, 17 by 
English, four by Peters, three by Shaw and two by Ardern. Flavell stands out as something of 
an outlier, perhaps because he used Facebook as a more explicit tool for constituency 
engagement. However, it is also interesting that he was the least interactive visually in 
terms of uploading photos of himself with others.  Our findings broadly reflect those of 
others which report low levels of interactivity: one of the primary reasons given for 
politicians’ reluctance to engage with citizens through direct response is the potential for 
losing control of the message (Heiss et al., 2018; Stromer-Galley, 2000). That concern is 
likely to be a contributory factor in our study too. 
In terms of interactivity on the citizen’s side, we looked at the volume of comments, 
shares and emoticons which posts provoked.  
 
Figure 1.  Patterns in audience shares, by PL 
 
 
  
Shares 
Across the corpus of 606 posts, a majority (78%) were shared at least once, although the 
poor response to many of Flavell’s posts (52% had no shares at all) considerably skews the 
average since without these very poorly performing posts, only 10% of the posts of the 
other four PLs received no shares. While not all her posts were shared extensively, overall 
Ardern’s followers performed the best in terms of sharing, with 50% of her posts being 
shared at least 50 times, including 24% being shared between 100 and 500 times. She was 
nearly twice as successful as English and Peters in this respect, where 31% and 26% of their 
posts respectively were shared at least 50 times. A further eight posts were shared more 
than 500 times, three each from English and Ardern and one each from Peters and Shaw. 
While most people would likely be pleased if even one of their posts received 10 shares, let 
alone 50 or 500, this level of positive endorsement is rather less impressive for PLs whose 
follower base, at least for English and Ardern, runs into hundreds of thousands of people.  
This low level of arguably the most important kind of interactivity, where posts are shared 
and thus extend the reach of the original message, is underwhelming. However, it is 
absolutely consonant with other literature including Larsson’s (2015) study of Facebook 
posts of nine PLs (including co-Leaders) in the 2013 Norwegian elections. It is also likely to 
be one of the primary reasons why political parties do not allocate more resources to their 
Facebook pages, since evidence indicates an ambivalent public response.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2.  Patterns in audience likes, by PL 
 
 
Likes 
Figure 2 reveals that the majority of posts made by the then PM English (84%) attracted 
more than 5000 likes, including 45% prompting more than 10,000.  A further five posts 
received between 10,000 and 20,000 likes.  By contrast, just under half of Ardern’s posts 
prompted more than 5000 likes as did 9% of those made by Peters and 2% of those made by 
Shaw.  As with shares, Flavell’s posts received fewest reactions, with 62% receiving less than 
100 likes and a further 5% receiving no response at all.   
We also explored the use of emoticon responses and with very few exceptions, they 
were overwhelmingly positive (e.g. love, hah-ha, wow). We found only 15 posts (2%) where 
the volume of negative emoticons (angry) was more than 10% of the combined number of 
positive emoticons and likes, six of which were posts made by Peters, followed by three 
from English, two from Ardern and one each from Flavell and Shaw.  Six of those posts, two 
from each of English, Ardern and Peters, were posts which also scored in the top three for 
each PL in terms of numbers of shares and comments.  
  
 
Figure 3.  Patterns in follower comments, by PL 
 
 
Follower comments 
When we look at comments (Figure 3), we see a similar pattern to shares in terms of which 
PL’s posts attracted the most public reaction: Ardern and English provoked significantly 
more commentary than the other three.  Again, Flavell’s posts were the least likely to 
attract comment, with 16% receiving no comments and 75% receiving fewer than 20, 
although 59% of Peters’ and 43% of Shaw’s posts also received fewer than 20 comments.   
Interpreting leaders’ interactivity 
What, if anything, can NZ PLs’ most provocative posts tell us about social mediated politics 
more broadly, and about what kinds of message move citizens to respond in both positive 
and negative ways? For Ardern, the post which had the most shares (1937), the most 
comments (871), the most likes (7100) and the second highest number of angry emoticons 
  
(52) was one of two PEBs she made on the topic of tax: that post also attracted 196,000 
views.  Ardern’s post which had the most (75) angry emoticons was another PEB, also about 
tax. It is interesting that these high levels of engagement were in response to a topic that 
she spent little time engaging with on Facebook in terms of original posts, but to which she 
was clearly linked by mainstream media.  We argue that this is a good example of the 
media’s priming effect, and one which has implications for politicians across various 
mediated campaign settings.   
For English, different posts provoked different responses: the post with the most 
shares (1753) was a PEB criticising Labour but the one prompting the most comments 
(2075) was a Live Facebook Q&A he did with one of his sons, which also attracted the 
second highest number of views (154,000). The post which provoked the highest number of 
angry emoticons (153) was a single photograph of English holding a ‘thumbs up’ placard 
with the message, ‘thumbs up if you’re party voting National’: on the other hand, it also 
prompted the second highest number of likes (6600).  Although there were very few 
negative posts overall, their ability to attract significant audience reaction has been 
documented in other studies (Heiss et al., 2019; Larsson, 2015), and was also observed by 
Neale Jones explaining Labour’s hesitancy to introduce such topics online: 
Every time we posted something about refugees on Facebook we got swamped with 
awful racist troll comments…there was so much hate, and that made us think twice 
about posting on such topics, not because it was unpopular or was damaging us but 
because there was so much vitriol, it was very difficult to deal with, to monitor and 
moderate. (Jones, 2018, personal communication) 
  
For Flavell, Peters and Shaw, the posts provoking the highest number of angry 
emoticons (84, 439 and 43 respectively) were posts critical of others, but where the public 
anger expressed was actually supportive of the poster’s position, not against it, constituting 
a form of empathic rage. In Flavell’s case, there was some explicit encouragement to 
provoke a particular response from his followers since he reported his mood before writing 
the post, by saying he was ‘feeling annoyed’, giving permission to his supporters to follow 
his emotional lead. This post was about a journalist giving misleading information about 
who could vote for the Maori Party which, for a small party, is potentially disastrous. That 
post also had the most shares (295) and the most comments (99).  The post with the most 
views was one of his PEBs (11,100) and one of Peters’ PEBs also attracted the most views for 
any of his posts (81,000). In Shaw’s case, his post commenting on the media’s exposure of 
the Government withholding a report on climate change had the most shares (140). In 
contrast, the post attracting the most likes (1100) showed him sitting crossed-legged on a 
mat holding several puppies with the single word caption, ‘puppies!’ It was a charming 
image, nothing to do with politics, but confirming the views expressed by Flavell and 
Bennett that the public are as interested in the politician-as-human as they are in the 
human-as-politician.  
Discussion and conclusion 
All the PLs favored Facebook content promoting their own campaigns and those of their 
Parties which is entirely predictable although there were interesting differences across 
other aspects of their posting behavior in terms of their use of visuals and humor, the 
proportion of personal content and their inclusion of family members.  These differences 
could be the consequence of both personal and party preferences, including the particular 
  
character of the PLs themselves, their confidence and interest in using Facebook, the 
approach adopted by their campaign teams and the willingness of family members to get 
involved. Volume differences could reflect the extent of party resources available or 
personal preferences about spending time on social media or spending time on the 
doorstep. For example, after the election, English (2018) said he enjoyed being on social 
media, especially working with his sons, and this came through clearly in a number of his 
posts.  However, Flavell also made several appearances with his daughter, hoping to 
leverage her large social media following but this was not effective in saving him or his Party 
at the ballot box. 
Comparing what our PLs chose to post about and the mainstream news agenda, there 
were some similarities in terms of the top topics (specifically the economy, with health and 
education also appearing in the top five topics across both, albeit in different positions), 
suggesting that for the most part, politicians and their parties use Facebook (and indeed 
other social media platforms) as a vehicle through which to engage the public with the 
messages they want to promote.  This was particularly noticeable in their policy-related 
posts where, although we discerned some differences in policy focus amongst the PLs, there 
were very few posts about crime or tax, both favorite topics of mainstream news.  Both 
Ardern (2018) and English (2018) have mentioned elsewhere their use of social media to 
bypass mainstream news. 
The ways in which social media can contribute to a more engaged polity has often 
been promoted as an enhancer of democracy but our findings suggest this hope remains 
largely aspirational. Although there were clear differences in the extent to which our five 
PLs interacted with their followers, and while at least one of the leaders (English) increased 
his interactivity since 2011 (Ross et al, 2015), overall levels of interactivity were low and 
  
echo findings from other studies (e.g. Gibson et al., 2014; Lilleker et al., 2011; Stromer-
Galley, 2000). We found no evidence that our sole female leader was more interactive than 
her male counterparts, though she was the second biggest poster of interactive photos, and 
the most likely to share photos of interactions with young people.  Flavell was by far the 
most interactive in terms of responding to comments, but his use of humor and a light touch 
with policy did not give him any traction on social media in terms of likes and shares, and 
did not raise his visibility in the mainstream media. 
In terms of public engagement, the most frequent reaction was to ‘like’ a post rather 
than share or comment on it, liking being the easiest and quickest way to show support, 
sometimes seen as symptomatic of a ‘clicktivist’ mentality (Larsson, 2015).  These likes 
undoubtedly display the kind of support which appears to endorse post content and could 
have a mobilising effect on others. However, followers who took the time to comment on 
posts were less evident.  While this article is not primarily focused on followers, we suggest 
that what motivates citizens to follow politicians on social media is likely to determine what 
they do when they get there. Notwithstanding that a proportion will be there to attack, 
those who are friends on Facebook are also friends with other people, and some studies 
suggest the propensity to make opinions known through commenting and sharing is related 
to self-confidence (Liu et al., 2017; Marder et al., 2016).  It is therefore safer to show 
(almost) faceless solidarity with thousands of others than to offer a comment or share and 
thus be (at least potentially) exposed to attack or opprobrium.  On the other hand, one 
reason Ardern’s posts were shared much more than any of the other PLs could lie in the 
more youthful profile of her Facebook support base, digital natives being very used to 
sharing everything online, or perhaps because she was seen as an agent of change, a 
sentiment with which individuals were willing to align. Some studies suggest that citizens 
  
follow politicians on social media partly because of their dissatisfaction with mainstream 
media (Fisher et al., 2019), so they may be seeking information but not necessarily be 
supporters.  Others suggest that that most politicians have little or no traction with the 
public and those who do, arguably high profile politicians such as PLs, should be considered 
outliers rather than the norm (Nielsen and Vaccari, 2013), suggesting that Facebook is not 
an effective form of political communication for the rank and file politician.   
Our findings make a useful contribution to the literature on social media and political 
communication, not least because so much of the extant work has focused on the US or 
Europe and we show that smaller nations exhibit very similar trends. Two of the clearest 
messages are that high levels of social media activity by politicians do not necessarily 
provoke high levels of follower response, nor predict electoral success. Ardern made the 
second fewest posts and scarcely responded to commenters, but attracted more shares 
than any other PL and significantly boosted Labour’s party vote. On the other hand, Flavell 
made the second highest number of posts, employed family connections, humor and a light 
hand with policy, but attracted the smallest number of responses and lost his seat, although 
in his electorate he increased his personal and party vote (Flavell, 2018, personal 
communication). The election ‘winner’ – at least in terms of party vote – was English, who 
did not achieve the same level of shares as Ardern but was the second most likely to 
respond to comments and had significantly more likes, combining a fairly robust policy focus 
with the softer appeal of including family members.  Notwithstanding the third-party 
campaign hands involved in the actual posts themselves, these findings demonstrate not 
only the complexity of the politician-citizen relationship on social media, but also prompt a 
consideration of the role of social media in the campaign tool-box.  They also suggest that 
some Parties are more successful than others in both attracting followers and encouraging 
  
engagement across social media platforms, reflecting their popularity in the offline 
environment.  What Facebook does not appear to be enabling is a genuine forum for two-
way communication and instead, what we mostly see is what Stromer-Galley (2019) calls 
‘controlled interaction’, carefully managed messages designed to explain rather than 
debate.  
Importantly, we found significant differences between the content of policy-focused 
posts and the mainstream news agenda, which suggests that the priming proclivities of the 
latter are subverted by political parties’ social media use. At the same time, and working in 
the opposite direction, efforts by politicians to prime the public and/or the media were not 
successful either: much of Flavell and Shaw’s post content concerned issues with which their 
parties are especially associated (e.g. Maori culture and rights, and the environment), which 
were more or less invisible in mainstream media articles. The only exception to this was 
citizen reaction to the sole written post Ardern made on the topic of tax, which prompted 
the highest level of engagement including the most angry emoticons, suggesting that, 
despite politicians’ attempts to claim the agenda, some topics are still too hot to handle.   
Ultimately, our study of NZ PLs provides little support for the equalizing potential of 
Facebook.  The two most visible leaders in mainstream media were also the two leaders 
who attracted the most public attention online, in comments, shares and likes, whereas the 
most prolific Facebook user was the only PL who lost his seat. There are clear limitations in 
studying social media in isolation from other influences on voter behavior and election 
outcomes, including mainstream media, political advertising, track record in government 
and electoral systems.  However, by focusing on a smaller nation with a proportional 
representation system of government, our study is a reminder of the importance of context 
  
and culture when interpreting the role of social media in contemporary election campaigns. 
It is also worth commenting that researching social media use is an ever-moving target, with 
platforms moving in and out of favour.  Evidence of Parties’ fortunes being positively 
affected by the extent to which they post or tweet is entirely contradictory. But it seems 
likely that social media will continue to play an important role in providing mechanisms 
through which citizens can learn about politics and policies which are not refracted through 
the prism of mainstream journalism. 
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